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The empirical literature on monetary policy shocks documents that contrac-
tionary shocks are followed by a persistent rise in interest rates and a persis-
tent fall in output. Standard monetary business cycle models can account for the
initial effects of monetary shocks, but have difﬁculty generating persistence. In
this paper, I examine whether frictions that affect the asset allocation decisions
of households can lead to persistent effects. In the model economy, households
hold two assets, one used for transactions (the checking account) and one used
for investment (the savings account). There is a small transaction cost for moving
funds between the accounts. Another key feature of the economy is that the busi-
ness sector accumulates retained earnings and credits proﬁts to the consumers
only with a delay. I show that in this environment monetary shocks have persis-
tent effects even when the adjustment cost is very small.
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In recent years a large number of studies have used the identiﬁed-VAR methodology
toassess theeffects of monetaryshocks. Thisliterature documents thatcontractionary
monetary shocks have a persistent negative effect on output and employment, and
a persistent positive effect on interest rates. For example, Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (1999) review a number of different approaches for identifying monetary
shocks, and ﬁnd that interest rates rise for at least six month after a contractionary
monetary shock, whereas the negative effect on output lasts for well over a year.
These conclusions are robust across most identiﬁcation schemes for monetary shocks
used in the literature.1
Explaining these ﬁndings is a challenge for economic theory. Frictionless models do
not generate any real effects of monetary disturbances. In the recent theoretical lit-
erature there are two main classes of models which generate real effects of monetary
shocks, the “liquidity” model and the “sticky-price” model (see Cole and Ohanian
2002 for a recent comparison of the two frameworks). Even though both models give
rise to real effects of monetary shocks, they have trouble generating persistence. In
the “liquidity” or“limited participation” model, households areunable toadjusttheir
asset holdings immediatelywhen a monetary shock hits (see Lucas Jr. 1990and Chris-
tiano and Eichenbaum 1992). Firms and banks can react to monetary disturbances at
once, whereas households react only with a delay of one period. The liquidity model
generates real effects of monetary shocks. However, the effects are short-lived. Once
h o u s e h o l d sa r ea b l et oa d j u s tt h e i ra s s e tp o s ition in the period following the shock, all
real effects disappear. The friction at theh e a r to ft h e“ s t i c k yp r i c e ”m o d e la r en o m -
inal rigidities generated by staggered price-setting (see Taylor 1980 and Blanchard
1991). While in a sticky-price models real effects can last longer than one period,
Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000) show that in a calibrated model with staggered
price setting there is very little persistence unless the frequency of price adjustments
is assumed to be unrealistically low.
This paper explores whether a model with a different friction, namely small ad-
justment costs for household asset transactions, can account for persistent effects of
1An exception is Uhlig (2000). Uhlig uses a Bayesian approach to identify monetary shocks, and
does not ﬁnd that contractionary monetary shocks lower output.
1monetary shocks. I develop an otherwise standard cash-in-advance model in which
households have checking and saving accounts and face a small adjustment cost for
transfers between their accounts. This cost can be interpreted as banking fees, as well
as the opportunity cost of the time which is used for carrying out the transactions (the
“shoe-leather” cost of the Baumol-Tobin model). Notice that this setup is very similar
to the liquidity model in spirit. In particular, the liquidity model can be interpreted
as an adjustment-cost model where the cost for immediate transactions is inﬁnite, but
the cost for scheduled future transactions is zero.
I use a calibrated version of the adjustment-cost model to ask two questions. First,
does the model generate real effects of monetary shocks that are similar to what is
observed in the data? Second, how large do the adjustment costs have to be to for the
real effects to be sizable and persistent? The answer to the ﬁrst question is a qualiﬁed
“yes.” The adjustment-cost model can generate real effects of monetary shocks, but
only if the model is extended to allow a realistic representation of the ﬂow of funds
between ﬁrms and households. Speciﬁcally, it is necessary to allow for retained earn-
ings in the business sector. Retained earnings serve to isolate the households from
the direct impact of monetary disturbances. If we do not allow for retained earnings,
persistence does not arise. This is a surprising outcome, in the sense that in existing
models the speciﬁcs of the ﬂow of funds between ﬁrms and households are not im-
portant for the transmission of monetary shocks. The answer to the second question
is that once we allow for retained earnings, very small adjustment costs are sufﬁcient
to lead to sizable and persistent real effects of monetary policy. The adjustment cost
is modeled as a time cost, and it can be quantiﬁed by comparing it to working time.
In the baseline calibration, the realized adjustment cost never exceeds three seconds
per quarter per person.
Our results stand in marked contrast to a number of existing papers that also intro-
duce adjustment costs within the liquidity-constraint framework, and ﬁnd that ad-
justment costs lead to persistent effects even without requiring the accumulation of
retained earnings (see, for example, Christiano and Eichenbaum 1992, Chari, Chris-
tiano, and Eichenbaum 1995, or Evans and Marshall 1998). The reason for the dif-
ferent ﬁndings is that the authors rely on a speciﬁc asymmetric formulation for the
adjustment cost. In particular, while adjusting savings is assumed to be costless, ad-
justing the amount of cash used for consumption expenditures is costly. As pointed
2out by Rotemberg (1995), this asymmetry is hard to justify from a microeconomic
perspective. In the existing models, an asymmetric adjustment cost is essential to
generate persistence, since the models require that savings react much more strongly
to a monetary shock that cash holdings. If the adjustment cost also applied to savings
or to transfers betweencash and savings, monetary shocks would no longer have per-
sistent real effects. This paper shows that if adjustment cost are introduced in a more
realistic form, the presence of retained earnings is necessary for monetary shocks to
have persistent effects.
Retained earnings matter for the transmission of monetary policy because they affect
the overall balance between different uses of funds in the economy. In the model,
funds can be used either for consumption expenditures or for savings. Since prices
are ﬂexible, the overall amount of funds that is initially available in the economy
does not affect real variables. In this sense, money is neutral. On the other hand,
the balance of the use of funds between consumption and savings does have real
consequences.
In the model economy, households own funds in two different ways. First, they hold
funds directly in their own checking and savings accounts. Second, households hold
funds indirectly through the ﬁrms in the economy, which they own. It is through
these indirect holdings that retained earnings matter. When a monetary shock hits,
initially only the asset holdings of ﬁrms are affected. For example, an expansionary
monetary shock increases the amount of funds held by the business sector. Since
funds held by the business sector are not used for consumption, the economywide
ratio of funds used for consumption and savings changes after such a shock. Without
adjustment costs, households would then lower their own savings to re-establish the
preferred ratio of consumption to savings. With adjustment costs, consumers adjust
their asset holdings to a lesser degree, and the resulting imbalance affects real vari-
a b l e ss u c ha so u t p u ta n de m p l o y m e n t .I fe a r nings in the business sector are retained,
the imbalance and therefore the real effects of the monetary shock will persist.
The implications of the model with retained earnings for the ﬂow of funds between
households and the business sector are in line with empirical ﬁndings. In the next
Section, we present evidence that shows that corporate proﬁts react quickly to a mon-
etary shock, whereas dividend payments adjust only after a considerable delay. Con-
sistent with this ﬁnding, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996) report that the
3household sector does not adjust its ﬁnancial assets and liabilities for several quarters
after a monetary shock, while there is an immediate impact on the business sector.
In summary, our results suggest that portfolio adjustment costs are a promising av-
enue for explaining persistent real effects of monetary shocks. A key ﬁnding is that a
better account of the ﬂow of funds between the household and business sectors may
be central for understanding the monetary transmission mechanism. This conclu-
sion puts the adjustment-cost model in marked contrast to existing monetary models,
which do not assign a major role to the ﬂow of funds.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an empirical analysis of
the relationship between monetary shocks and corporate proﬁts and dividends. The
model is introduced in Section 3. Section 4 discusses some theoretical results on the
effects of monetary shocks, and shows how the decision problem of the household is
modiﬁed in different versions of the model.I nS e c t i o n5t h em o d e li sc a l i b r a t e d ,a n d
numerical experiments are carried out to assess the effects of monetary shocks in the
adjustment-cost model. Section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical Evidence
This section examines the effects of monetary shocks on corporate proﬁts and divi-
dend payments. A central conjecture of this paperisthatproﬁts or losses inthe corpo-
rate sector which arise from monetary shocks are transferred to households only with
a delay. Ifthis conjecture istrue, the asset position of the household sector is insulated
temporarily form the effects of monetary disturbances. The theoretical analysis in the
remainder of the paper will show that this insulation has important implications for
the real effects of monetary shocks.
Following the major part of the empirical literature on monetary shocks, we rely on
the identiﬁed-VAR methodology to assess the reactions of aggregate economic vari-
ables to monetary disturbances. In particular, our speciﬁcation is close to Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996). The data set contains quarterly observations on U.S.
economic and monetary aggregates from the ﬁrst quarter of 1959 until the third quar-
ter of 2002. The following variables were included in the analysis: Real GDP (Y), the
4GDP deﬂator (P), an index of commodity prices (PCOM), total reserves (TR), non-
borrowed reserves (NBR), the federal funds rate (FF), real corporate proﬁts (PR),
and real corporate dividends (DIV). With the exception of the federal funds rate,
all variables are in logs. Proﬁts and dividends were deﬂated using the GDP deﬂa-
tor.2 T h ec o m m o d i t yp r i c ei n d e xw a si n c l u d e d to avoid the well known price puzzle.
Without this measure, contractionary monetary policy shocks (deﬁned as orthogo-
nalized innovations to FF or NBR) lead to a prolonged rise in the price level (see
Sims). As discussed in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996), this anomalous
response disappears if a measure of commodity prices is included in the VAR. The
usual interpretation is that commodity prices matter, because they contain informa-
tion about future inﬂation that is available to the policy maker, but not contained in
the remaining variables in the VAR.
Monetary shocks wereidentiﬁedbybyimposingatriangular structure onthevariance-
covariance matrix of the error term. In other words, the variables were ordered such
that each variable can have an instantaneous effect only on variables lower in the or-
der. The following ordering was employed: Y, P, PCOM, FF, NBR, TR, RPR, RDIV.
This is the same ordering as in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995), with new the vari-
ables speciﬁc to this analysis (RPR and RDIV) ordered last. It appears plausible to
order dividends after proﬁts, since proﬁts ﬁrst have to exist before they can be dis-
tributed. Of course, the impulse response functions presented below depend to some
degree on the speciﬁc ordering employed. In terms of the overall effect of monetary
shock, whatappearsto matter most isthatY is ordered ﬁrst. Our basic conclusions re-
garding the relationship between monetary shocks, corporate proﬁts, and dividends
are surprisingly robust with respect to the ordering of the Cholesky decomposition.
In particular, the effects are virtually unchanged if dividends are ordered before prof-
its.
I use orthogonalized shocks to FF as the deﬁnition of a monetary policy shock. Us-
i n gas h o c kt on o n - b o r r o w e dr e s e r v e sa sa n alternative measure yields similar re-
sults. Figure 1 shows the impulse response of the main variables we are interested
in to a one-standard-deviation contractionary shock to FF. The dashed lines are two-
standard error bands. Output starts to decline with a delay of two quarters after the
2All data were extracted from the FRED data base at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The
identiﬁcation codesforthe seriesare: GDPC1, GDPDEF, PPICRM,TRARR, BOGNONBR, FEDFUNDS,
CPROFIT, and DIVIDEND.
5Q u a r t e r 01 2 3456789 1 0 1 1
Response -1.6 0.2 8.7 15.8 18.8 18.9 15.8 10.4 6.2 3.3 1.5 1.0
Accumulated -1.6 -1.3 7.3 23.2 42.0 60.9 76.6 87.1 93.2 96.5 98.0 99.0
Table 1: Reaction of Dividends to Proﬁt Shock (Percent of Total Impact)
shock, with the largest impact occurring after about two years. The reaction of proﬁts
has a similar shape as the reaction of output. Notice, however, that the reaction of
proﬁts is much stronger than the reaction of output in magnitude. A contractionary
monetary policy shock therefore has a sizable negative impact on the proﬁts of the
corporate sector. Corporate dividends reﬂect these lower proﬁts, but only with a de-
lay. The impulse response function of dividends shows almost no reaction for the
ﬁrst ﬁve quarters after the monetary shock, and turns negative thereafter. The reac-
t i o n so fp r o ﬁ t sa n dd i v i d e n d sh a v eas i m i l a r magnitude, but the reaction of dividends
is delayed relative to proﬁts. The results are consistent with the conjecture that the
corporate sector transfers proﬁts or losses to households only with a delay. Figure 2
repeats the same exercise with nominal proﬁts and dividends, instead of inﬂation-
adjusted ﬁgures. The results are very similar to Figure 1.
Figure 3 displays impulse response functions for shocks to GDP, real proﬁts, and real
dividends. Of particular interest here is the reaction of dividends to a change in prof-
its. Notice that ourordering assumption allowsdividendsto adjust immediatelyafter
a shock to proﬁts. The graph shows, however, that this does not happen. Instead, the
reaction of dividends to a change in proﬁts is hump-shaped, with almost no immedi-
ate reaction, and the maximum impact being reached only after ﬁve to six quarters.
Thus, once again the results back up our assumption that the corporate sector retains
earnings. This result is entirely plausible if we take into account how decisions on
dividend payments are made in practice. While dividends are often paid quarterly,
the vast majority of ﬁrms adjusts dividends at most once a year, based on proﬁts in
the precedingyear. Additionaldelaysarisebecauseofﬁcial proﬁtﬁgures aregenerally
available only a few months after the end of a ﬁscal year, and shareholder meetings
are held even later.
For the purposes of calibrating the theoretical model described below, it will be useful
to look at the relationship of dividends and proﬁts in more detail. Table 1 shows how
the reaction of dividends to a shock to proﬁts is spread out over time. The largest
6impact occurs ﬁve quarters after impact. Half of the total accumulated impact is
reached between four and ﬁve quarters after impact, and the reaction fades out about
three years after the innovation to proﬁts.
In summary, the empirical evidence supports the conjecture that contractionary mon-
etary shock lower corporate proﬁts, and that this change affects households in the
form of lower dividend payments only with a delay. Consistent with these ﬁndings,
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996) report that the household sector does not
adjust its ﬁnancial assets and liabilities for several quarters after a monetary shock.
The next section develops a model that demonstrates why these ﬁndings may be im-
portant for the transmission of monetary shocks.
3 The Model
The model is based on the standard cash-in-advance framework. The economy is
populated by the monetary authority and a continuum of three types of competitive
agents: households, ﬁrms, and banks. There is measure one of each type of agent, so
that the model can be formulated in terms of a representative household, ﬁrm, and
bank. Apart from the cash-in-advance constraint, there are two additional frictions
present in the baseline model: a liquidity constraint and an adjustment cost. The
liquidity constraint forces consumers to make saving decisions before the monetary
shock is revealed, while the adjustment cost penalizes changes in the stock of sav-
ings. The liquidity constraint can be interpreted as an inﬁnite adjustment cost for
immediate changes in savings. The baseline model incorporates the liquidity con-
straint to facilitate comparisons to earlier literature. Speciﬁcally, if adjustment costs
are set to zero, the economy reduces to the baseline model in Christiano and Eichen-
baum (1995). I also consider a version of the model without the liquidity constraint. If
adjustment costs are set to zero in this version, the economy reduces to the stochastic
cash-in-advance model considered by Cooley and Hansen (1989).
7Assets and the Monetary Authority
In the model economy, consumers have access to two different assets, checking ac-
counts and saving accounts. All transactions are settled using the checking account.
Banks are subject to a 100 percent reserve requirement on checking accounts, which
implies that these accounts carry no interest in equilibrium.3
There is a central bank which supplies currency to the economy. The money stock
at the beginning of period t is denoted by Mt. Since households and ﬁrms do not
hold any cash (the only assets are checking and savings accounts), all the money is
in hands of the banks. The central bank carries out monetary policy by giving a cash
injection Xt to the bank at the beginning of period t. Xt is a random variable, and
monetary policy is the only source of uncertainty in the model. The money stock Mt
evolves according to:
Mt+1 = Mt + Xt.( 1 )
Banks
Thereisacompetitive bankingindustrywhich acceptsdepositsfrom ﬁrmsandhouse-
holds and makes loans to ﬁrms. Banks are owned by the households. At the begin-
ning of the period, the assets of the bank consist of the money stock Mt (recall that the
entire money stock is held by the bank). The liabilities consist of the checking deposit
Dt and the saving deposit St of the household. We will see later that the bank makes
proﬁts and transfers proﬁts to the households (who own the bank) only with a delay.
Consequently, there is an amount Πt of retained earnings that was carried over from
earlier periods. Since assets have to equal liabilities, we have:
Mt = Dt + St + Πt.( 2 )
The ﬁrst event within the period is the realization of the monetary policy shock. The
central bank hands out Xt dollars to the bank. After the arrival of the monetary injec-
3Even though cash is not used for transactions in the economy, results are the same as in an other-
wise identical economy that uses only cash and no checking accounts at all. In other words, checking
accounts could equivalently be labeled as cash. I prefer the checking-account terminology since most
of M1 is made up of deposits. The important distinction is between non-interest-bearing assets that
can be used for transactions, and interest-bearing assets such as saving accounts.
8tion Xt, the bank gives a loan Bt to the ﬁrm, where the loan takes a form of a demand
deposit make available to the ﬁrm. The bank has to observe the 100 percent reserve
requirement on checking accounts, that is, the demand deposits have to be backed by
cash:
Dt + Bt ≤ Mt + Xt.( 3 )
The banking industry is competitive, so that the interest rate rt is taken as given by
the bank. The optimization problem of the bank is to maximize proﬁts from giving




s u b j e c tt o( 3 ) .A sl o n ga st h ei n t e r e s tr a t eis non-negative (as will be assumed later),
the problem of the bank has a trivial solution: the loan Bt will be the maximum possi-
blegiventhereserve requirement, sothatthereserve requirementholdswithequality.
All transactions during the period are transfers between the demand deposits of the
ﬁrm and the household. At the end of the period, after the ﬁrm pays back the loan,
the bank credits fraction λ of retained earnings Πt to the consumer’s checking ac-
count. Here λ is an institutional parameter that represents the rate at which retained
earnings ﬂow from the business sector to households. Typically λ will be smaller
than one, which reﬂects that businesses usually do not pay dividends whenever a
cash ﬂow occurs, but only in larger intervals. Since the consumers own the banks, in
a frictionless model they would consider retained earnings as equivalent to their own
savings, and the choice of λ would be irrelevant. In the adjustment-cost economy, in
contrast, the value of λ is a key determinant of the effects of monetary shocks.
The current proﬁts of the bank in period t a r eg i v e nb yt h es u mo ft h em o n e t a r y
injection Xt and net interest income rt(Bt − St). The law of motion for the retained
earnings of the bank is therefore:
Πt+1 = Xt + rt(Bt − St)+( 1 − λ)Πt.
Using the accounting identity (2), the reserve requirement can be written as Bt ≤
St + Πt + Xt. Since the reserve requirement holds with equality in equilibrium, the
9law of motion for retained earnings can also be expressed as:
Πt+1 =( 1 + rt)(Bt − St) − λΠt,o r :
Πt+1 =( 1 + rt)(Πt + Xt) − λΠt.
The last equation shows that proﬁts arise from loaning existing retained earnings
and the monetary injection to the ﬁrm. Notice that even though retained earnings
evolve over time, the decision problem of the bank has a static solution which does
not depend on intertemporal prices.
In terms of the application of the model, the bank proﬁts should be interpreted as
the proﬁts arising in the entire corporate sector as a result of monetary injections. We
assign all the proﬁts to the bank merely for convenience; this convention allows us to
keep the decision problem of production ﬁrms particularly simple.
Production
I nt h eb a s e l i n ee c o n o m y ,t h ep r o d u c t i o ntechnology is linear and uses only labor.
While capital accumulation will be introduced as an extension below, the labor-only
case facilitates the analysis of the role of adjustment costs and retained earnings for
the transmission of monetaryshocks. Therepresentative ﬁrm operates thetechnology
yt = l1t to produce the consumption good. The ﬁrm hires labor l1t from the household
at wage Wt, and sells the consumption good to the household at price Pt. Following
Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995), it is assumed that the wage bill has to be paid
before payments for the consumption good are received. The ﬁrm therefore requires
al o a nBt from the bank to cover the wage bill Wt l1t. The nominal interest rate for the




{Ptl1t − Wtl1t − rtBt} subject to:
Wtl1t ≤ Bt.
Since the decision problem is linear, ﬁrms make zero proﬁts in equilibrium, and the
scale of production is determined outside the production sector. Notice that since the
10ﬁrm has to borrow the wage bill, the real wage depends on the interest rate. This
interdependence is necessary to generate real effects of monetary shocks.
Preferences










Thehousehold enters period twith abalance Dt onthe checkingaccountand St on the
savings account. In the morning, after the monetary shock is realized, the household
buys consumption goods ct subject to the “cash-in-advance” constraint Ptct ≤ Dt,
that is, purchases cannot exceed the existing balance on the checking account. The
household works l1t hours for wageWt, getsinterestrtSt on thebalanceon thesavings
account, and receives a dividend λΠt from the bank. After all other transactions are
settled, the household makes a transfer It from the checking to the savings account.
However, carrying out this transaction takes time and is therefore costly in terms of
leisure. The time l2t required for the transfer is determined by l2t = g(It/Mt),w h e r e
Mt is the money stock at the beginning of the period and g is nonnegative convex
function.4
The household’s problem is to maximize (4) subject to the following constraints:
Ptct ≤Dt,( 5 )
Dt+1 =Dt + rtSt + λΠt + Wtl1t − It − Ptct,( 6 )
St+1 =St + It,( 7 )
l2t =g(It/Mt),( 8 )
lt =l1t + l2t.( 9 )
Constraint (5) is the cash-in-advance constraint, equation (6) is the law of motion
for the checking account, equation (7) is the law of motion for the savings account,
4The adjustment cost is deﬁned relative to the money stock, so that adjustment costs are constant
in a steady state with constant money growth.
11equation (8) determines the adjustment cost, and equation (9) states that total non-
leisure time is divided between work and adjusting the savings account.
Equilibrium
To close the model, the marketclearing conditions for the goods and the assetmarkets
need to be speciﬁed. The market clearing condition for the asset market is:
Mt+1 = Dt+1 + St+1 + Πt+1, (10)
that is, the initial money stock in the next period has to equal retained earnings plus
the demand for checking and savings deposits by the household. The goods market
clearing constraint is:
ct = l1t. (11)
Figure 4 summarizes the sequence of events in period t. The ﬁrst event of the day
is the cash transfer Xt from the monetary authority to the bank, and the last event
is the transfer It from the consumer’s checking account to the savings account. The
cash-in-advance constraint is the requirement that the household cannot use receipts
within the period to buy the consumption good, and the liquidity constraint requires
that transfers between the checking and savings accounts are carried out only after
all other transactions are settled.
It is convenient to redeﬁne variables relative to the money stock at the beginning of
the period. Iwill use lowercase letters todenote variablesrelative to the moneystock,
that is, pt = Pt/Mt, wt = Wt/Mt, xt = Xt/Mt, bt = Bt/Mt, it = It/Mt, dt = Dt/Mt,
st = St/Mt,a n dπt = Πt/Mt.
Deﬁnition 1 (Equilibrium with Liquidity Timing) Let Ωt denote the information that
is known in period t, i.e., the history of all monetary shocks up to and including period t.
An equilibrium given a money supply process xt(Ωt) consists of allocation functions ct(Ωt),
lt(Ωt),l 1t(Ωt),l 2t(Ωt) dt(Ωt−1),s t(Ωt−1), πt(Ωt−1),b t(Ωt),i t(Ωt) and price functions
pt(Ωt),w t(Ωt),r t(Ωt) such that:









ptct ≤ dt, (13)
(1 + xt)dt+1 = dt + rtst + λπt + wtl1t − it − ptct, (14)
(1 + xt)st+1 = st + it, (15)
l2t = g(it), (16)
lt = l1t + l2t. (17)
2. The representative ﬁrm solves:
max{ptl1t − wtl1t − rtbt} subject to: (18)
wtl1t ≤ bt.
3. The bank solves:
max{rt(bt − st)} subject to: (19)
bt ≤ 1 + xt − dt, (20)
(1 + xt)πt+1 =( 1 + rt)(bt − st) − λπt. (21)
4. The market-clearing conditions are satisﬁed:
ct = l1t, (22)
1 = dt+1 + st+1 + πt+1. (23)
Equilibrium with Cash-in-Advance Timing
The liquidity constraint and the adjustment cost serve a similar purpose in the model.
In particular, the liquidity constraint can be interpreted as an inﬁnite cost for imme-
diate adjustments in savings. To disentangle the role of the liquidity constraint and
the adjustment cost, I also consider a version of the model without the liquidity con-
straint. In this version of the model, timing is as in the usual cash-in-advance model,
13that is, consumers are allowed to adjust their savings after the monetary shock hits
and before purchasing consumption goods. Figure 5 displays the time line for this
version of the model. The deﬁnition of an equilibrium changes in two places.
Deﬁnition 2 (Equilibrium with Cash-in-Advance Timing) The deﬁnition of an equi-
librium with cash-in-advance timing is identical to Deﬁnition 1 with the exception of two
changes:
• The cash-in-advance constraint (13) is replaced by:
ptct ≤ dt − it. (24)
• The reserve requirement (20) becomes:
bt ≤ 1 + xt − (dt − it). (25)
Equation (24) reﬂects the fact that only the balance on the checking account after
adjusting savings can be used for consumption purchases, since the transfer to the
checking account is made at the beginning of the period. Similarly, the reserve re-
quirement changes to (25) since the balance on the consumer’s checking account
changes before the loan is given.
Equilibrium with Capital Accumulation
So far, we have concentrated on a model with labor as the only factor of production.
The relative simplicity of this framework will be useful to work out how a monetary
shock affects private households through the ﬂow of assets between households and
the corporate sector in isolation. Anumberof authors argue (see, forexample, Dow Jr.
1995), however, than endogenous accumulation of capital is an important channel
for the transmission of monetary shocks. This section extends the basic model by
introducing physical capital as a factor of production. This will allow us to assess
whether the presence of additional assets leads to major modiﬁcations of our basic
results.
14The main choice that has to taken when introducing capital in the model is whether
households or ﬁrms hold capital. This is a choice of convenience only, since both
versions lead to the same results. In our model, it turns out to be easiest to hand
the capital to consumers directly. The reason is that if ﬁrms or intermediaries make
investment decisions, they have to take into account exactly how consumers value
different dividend streams. This is complicated in our model, since the retained-
earnings assumption implies that the earnings of any given period are paid out to
consumers over many different periods. We therefore hand the investment decisions
to the households, and leave the bank’s and the ﬁrm’s problem mostly intact.
The decisions problem for households in the version with physical capital is to maxi-
mize utility (4) subject to (5), (7), (9), and the following modiﬁed constraints:
Dt+1 =Dt + rtSt + RKtkt + λΠt + Wtl1t − It − Ptzt − Ptct, (26)
kt+1 =(1 − δ)kt + zt, (27)
l2t =g(It/Mt,zt). (28)
Here kt is the capital stock in period t, zt is investment, and δ is the depreciation
rate. There are two different interest rates; rt is the interest paid on savings, and
RKt is the return paid on physical capital. In a deterministic model, if both St and
kt are positive there would be an arbitrage condition requiring that [(1 − δ)Pt+1 +
RKt]/Pt = 1 + rt holds. In the stochastic model, this condition holds only in expected
value, since monetary shocks affect the two returns differently. Also notice that the
adjustment cost function (28) now also depends on investment zt, which allows us to
treat investment in physical capital (or equity) zt symmetrically with investment in
ﬁnancial assets It.
The central bank and the banking sector work just as before. The production sector
now operates a constant-returns technology employing capital and labor. I assume
that the technology is Cobb-Douglas with capital share α. The ﬁrm rents capital and
labor from households, and needs to borrow the wage bill as well as the current cost






1t −Wtl1t − Rktkt − rtBt

subject to:
Wtl1t + Rktkt ≤ Bt.
15Since the production function exhibits constant returns, ﬁrms make zero proﬁts in
equilibrium.
Once again, we will redeﬁne variables relative to the money stock at the beginning of
the period. The only additional variable that needs to be transformed is the return on
capital: rKt = RKt/Pt.
Deﬁnition 3 (Equilibrium with Capital Accumupation) Anequilibriumgivenamoney
supply process xt(Ωt) and initial capital level k0 consists of allocation functions ct(Ωt),
lt(Ωt),l 1t(Ωt),l 2t(Ωt) dt(Ωt−1),s t(Ωt−1),i t(Ωt),k t(Ωt),z t(Ωt), πt(Ωt−1),b t(Ωt),a n d
price functions pt(Ωt),w t(Ωt),r t(Ωt),r Kt(Ωt),s u c ht h a t :
1. The representative household maximizes utility (4) subject to (13), (15), (17),a n dt h e
following constraints:
(1 + xt)dt+1 = dt + rtst + rKtkt + λπt + wtl1t − it − pt(zt + ct),
kt+1 =( 1 − δ)kt + zt,
l2t = g(it,zt).





1t − wtl1t − rKtkt − rtbt

subject to: (29)
wtl1t + rKtkt ≤ bt.
3. The bank maximizes proﬁts (19) subject to (20) and (21).
4. The market-clearing conditions (23) and:




164 What Happens After a Monetary Shock?
This section takes a closer look at the decision problems of banks, ﬁrms, and house-
holds to analyze the effects of a monetary shock in the model economy. Throughout
the analysis, money supply is assumed to be a ﬁrst-order Markov process. I limit
attention to stationary equilibria, so that decisions are functions of the state variables
and the money supply shock only, and for analytical convenience it is assumed that
the cash-in-advance constraint holds with equality. The money supply process can
always be chosen such that this condition is fulﬁlled in equilibrium, and in the com-
putational part below the process is chosen accordingly. I will also concentrate on the
version of the model without capital accumulation; the effects of introducing capital
will be discussed in Section 5.
In the model without capital, both the ﬁrm and the bank have static problems which
have simple solutions. Since households cannot react immediately to a monetary
shock, it is therefore straightforward to determine the initial effects of a monetary
shock by analyzing the ﬁrm and the bank in isolation. As long as the nominal interest
rate is nonnegative, it is optimal for the ﬁrm to borrow exactly as much money as
is required to pay wages. The ﬁrst-order condition for the ﬁrm’s problem (18) then
implies:
pt =( 1 + rt)wt. (30)
The only decision variable for the bank is the size of the loan bt offered to the ﬁrm. If
the interest rate is positive, it is optimal to lend the maximum amount possible. Then
(20) holds with equality, and since bt = wtl1t from the ﬁrm’s problem, we have:
wtl1t = 1 + xt − dt. (31)
The cash-in-advance constraint (13) and the goods market clearing constraint (22)




1 + xt − dt
dt
. (32)
Equation (32) links the real wage to the monetary shock and the balance on the check-
ing account. From (30) we have 1+ rt = pt/wt, so that the interest rate is determined
17by:
1 + rt =
dt
1 + xt − dt
. (33)
Equations (32) and (33) give us some ﬁrst results about the effects of monetary policy
shock. A contractionary money supply shock corresponds to a low realization of xt.
Since dt cannot be adjusted in response to the shock, equations (32) and (33) imply
that this shock leads to an immediate drop in the real wage and rise in the interest
rate. This is a standard outcome in models with a liquidity constraint. Because less
funds are available in the credit market after a contractionary shock, the interest rate
increases to clear the market. This in turn increases the wedge between price and
wage, so that the real wage falls. Since the household’s labor supply depends on the
real wage, output declines as well.
So far, we have established that a contractionary shock has the “right” effects on im-
pact, i.e., interest rates rise and output falls. What does it take to make these effects
persistent? Since the underlying source oft h ee f f e c t si sal a c ko ff u n d si nt h ec r e d i t
market, the effects will be persistent if the fraction of funds used for purchases dt
(the checking-account balance) is above its steady-state value in subsequent periods.
Formally, notice that the interest rate is strictly increasing in dt in (33). If a large frac-
tion of funds is used for purchases, once again less funds are available in the credit
market, which reiterates the original effect of the contractionary shock.
To see how this relates to savings (and ultimately the adjustment cost), we can use
the market-clearing condition 1 = dt + st + πt to rewrite (33) as:
1 + rt =
dt
xt + st + πt
. (34)
(34) shows that the impact of contractionary shock on the interest rate (which in turn
affects output) ispersistent ifdt increasesrelative to st +πt aftertheshock. Notice that
since bank proﬁts depend on the size of the cash injection, πt is below steady state in
the periods after a contractionary shock. Therefore, even if st does not change, the fall
in retained earnings will induce a rise in dt relative to st + πt, which propagates the
lack of funds in the credit market. In a frictionless model, households would consider
the bank’s retained earnings as equivalent to their own savings, since the households
own the bank. When retained earnings fall, households would increase their own
savings to reach the preferred level of overall savings. With the portfolio adjustment
18cost, households change st only slowly and do not offset the decrease in retained
earnings entirely. Therefore the lack of funds in the credit market is propagated, and
the effects of the original shock are persistent.
Notice that portfolio adjustment costs would not generate persistence if we did not
allow for retained earnings. In the standard limited-participation model of Christiano
and Eichenbaum (1995) all funds, including bank proﬁts, ﬂow to the household at the
end of every period. In this model, even with an adjustment cost the share of savings
in total funds does not decrease after a contractionary shock. In fact, numerical ex-
periments in Section 4 will show that without retained earnings the long-run effects
of a monetary shock are the exact opposite of the initial effect.
To build further intuition for the results, it is useful to examine how the the decision
problem of the household is modiﬁed by the various frictions in the model economy.
I will start with with the cash-in-advance version of the model, which allows house-
holds to adjust their savings after the monetary shock. The ﬁrst-order conditions for





















Condition (35) reﬂects the tradeoff between leisure today and consumption tomor-
row. Thecash-in-advance constraint impliesthatcurrent labor income can be used for
purchasing consumption goods only in the next period. The presence of 1+ xt in this
equation drives a wedge between the marginal utility from leisure and the marginal
utility from consumption. In the cash-in-advance model of Cooley and Hansen (1989)
this wedge is the only source of real effects of monetary policy shocks. If the money
supply process is autocorrelated, the current realization of the shock inﬂuences the
expectation on the right hand side, which in turn affects incentives to work in the
current period. This expectational effect does not help to explain why output falls
after a contractionary shock. If a contractionary shock signals lower inﬂation in the
future (implying lower xt and a smaller value for the wedge), output would in fact
increase, which is the opposite of what is observed in the data.
19Condition (36) comes into play when the household decides on savings. If there is no
adjustment cost and g(it) is zero, (36) simpliﬁes to:









(37) can be further simpliﬁed if the money supply process is i.i.d. Since we are con-
sidering stationary equilibria, with i.i.d. shocks the expectations in (35) and (37) are
constants, which implies that consumption and labor are constant, and the price and
wage are inversely proportional to 1 + xt. Hence, with zero adjustment cost, cash-in-
advance timing, and i.i.d. shocks, there are no real effects of monetary shocks.
Let us now see how the decision problem of the consumer is modiﬁed if we introduce
the liquidity constraint, so that the household cannot adjust savings immediately af-
ter a monetary shock. With liquidity timing, the ﬁrst-order conditions are (35) and:
u2(ct,1− lt)
	













If g(it) is identically zero, (38) simpliﬁes to:







Using (35), applying the law of iterated expectations, and shifting one period back-
wards yields:







This equation is similar to (37), but notice that the time index on the expectation
operator has shifted back one period. The household still faces the same incentives
with regards to savings, but since savings cannot be adjusted immediately, the ﬁrst-
order condition only holds in expected value. Within the period, no adjustment is
possible, and real effects arise due to the lack or abundance of funds in the credit
market.
We therefore see that the liquidity constraint as such without adjustment cost leaves
the optimality constraint intact, in the sense that it still holds in expected value one
20period ahead. The agents can be surprised, but just for one period. Therefore, real ef-
fects of monetary shocks do not persist. However, if adjustment costs are not zero, the
presence of the adjustment-cost function in (38) introduces further modiﬁcations to
the optimality conditions. Given sufﬁciently high adjustment cost, the conditions can
be changed in almost arbitrary ways. The interesting question then becomes whether
realistically small adjustment costs are sufﬁcient to generate persistence. This ques-
tion is addressed in the next section.
5 Small Adjustment Costs and Persistence
In this section I discuss the quantitative properties of the model. Simulations require
the choice of speciﬁc functional forms and parameter values. The parameterization
of preferences and technology follows Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995). The utility
function is:
u(ct,1− lt)=ψln(ct)+( 1 − ψ)ln(1 − lt).
The model period is chosen to be one quarter. The utility parameters were set to
β = 0.99 (corresponding to a risk-free real interest rate of 4 percent p.a.) and ψ = .24.
The adjustment-cost function is quadratic:
g(it)=a(it + b)2 = a((1 + xt)st+1 − st + b)2.
The parameter b in the adjustment cost function was set such that adjustment costs
are zero in the deterministic steady state. The parameter a is left unspeciﬁed for now.
The dividend-payment parameter λ was set to to match the evidence on the effects of
proﬁts ondividends inTable1. Thetableshows that50percentof the total cumulative
impact on dividend payments is reached between four and ﬁve quarters after a shock
to corporate proﬁts. To match the half-life of retained earnings in the model to this
observation, λ is chosen such that (1 − λ)4.5 = 0.5, which results in λ = 0.14.
The process for money supply is given by:
xt+1 = ¯ x + ρxt + σ t+1,
where  t+1 is i.i.d. normal with mean zero and unit variance. ¯ x was chosen to re-
21sult in an average inﬂation rate of one percent per quarter or four percent per year,
which matches average inﬂation in the U.S. from 1959 to 2002 in the data set used in
Section 2. The parameter σ governs the standard deviation of (quarterly) inﬂation,
and was set to σ = 0.006 to match the empirical counterpart. Different values for
ρ where used to explore the impact of persistence in the money supply process on
the economic consequences of monetary shocks. Speciﬁcally, we will compare out-
comes under i.i.d money shocks (ρ = 0) and outcomes with a correlation coefﬁcient
of ρ = 0.5 The i.i.d case has the advantage that it isolates the effects of the liquidity
constraint and adjustment costs from the anticipated-inﬂation effects discussed by
Cooley and Hansen (1989).
In a stationary equilibrium the decisions of households, ﬁrms, and the bank are
functions of the state variables dt, st,a n dxt only. Retained earnings are given by
πt = 1 − dt − st and therefore do not need to be included as a separate state variable.
The problems of the ﬁrm and the bank are static and can be computed directly. The
household’s decisions can be summarized by policy functions that map the state vec-
tor into household decisions. Since analytical solutions are not available, numerical
approximations to the true decision rules were computed.5. Given the policy func-
tions, I simulated the economy to derive the effects of a monetary shock. Speciﬁcally,
I computed impulse response functions for a contractionary money supply shock for
different versions of the model. The graphs in Figures 6 to 12 show the response
of a number of variables to a shock over a period of twelve quarters. The economy
starts out in the steady state in the ﬁrst quarter. In the second quarter a one-standard-
deviation negative money supply shock hits, which implies that the money shock
grows by 0.4 percent instead of one percent.
The Role of Adjustment Costs and Retained Earnings
Figure 6 shows the results for the model with liquidity timing and zero adjustment
cost, i.e., a = 0. To isolate the effect of the liquidity constraint from the expected-
inﬂation effect, we set the autocorrelation of money supply to zero for now, i.e., ρ = 0.
As discussed in the last section, in this case the real effects of the monetary shock
5More speciﬁcally, a perturbation method was used. I computed second-order approximations to
the policy functions, following the approach of Judd and Guu (1997) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2001).
22last only one period. On impact of the shock, output, labor supply, and consump-
tion (which are all equal in the labor-only model) fall, while the interest rate rises in
response to the lack of funds in the credit market. At the end of the period, the house-
hold adjust savings, and all real variables return to their steady-state value. Notice
how the household adjusts savings to exactly offset the change in retained earnings
in order to keep overall savings at the desired level. The inﬂation rate increases on
impact of the shock, and declines only in the following period. The negative mone-
tary shock cannot lower prices immediately, because the amount of funds dt available
in the goods market is ﬁxed, and the higher interest rate raises the cost of production
from the perspective of the ﬁrm. If the process for money supply were positively
autocorrelated instead of i.i.d., there would be persistent effects, albeit in the wrong
direction. A negative monetary shock would lower expected inﬂation and therefore
increase the incentive to work, leading to higher future consumption.
T og a u g ew h i c hr a n g eo fa d j u s t m e n tc o s t si sr e a s o n a b l e ,w ec a nu s et h er e s u l t sd i s -
played in Figure 6 to compute which adjustment costs the household would face for
any given a if we hold constant the optimal path of savings at no adjustment cost. If
the adjustment cost parameter were a = 10 instead of zero, but the household still
followed the same path of savings, the adjustment cost would peak at 0.02 percent
of time worked. Assuming that an average worker works about 500 hours in a quar-
ter, this translates into a maximum adjustment time of about six minutes per quarter.
Even this maximum cost appears moderate relative to the actual time people spend
on ﬁnancial transactions. Note that if the adjustment cost is imposed, the actual cost
will be even lower, because the consumer can modify the saving decision.
Figure 7 shows results for the same model with an adjustment cost parameter of
a = 10. The fall in output is more pronounced than in the model without adjust-
ment cost, and persists for about three quarters after the shock. The effect on the
interest rate is also persistent. By comparing the graphs for savings in Figures 6 and
7, we can see that the rise in savings is much smaller with the adjustment cost. The
household still makes up for part of the decrease in retained earnings, but the in-
crease is not offset completely, and the checking-account balance increases relative to
the money stock. Compared to the cost that would accrue with the path of savings
in Figure 1, adjustment costs are miniscule. The maximum adjustment cost makes
up about 0.0002 percent of time worked, which translates into less than three seconds
23per quarter.
Thus, Figure 7 shows that even small adjustment costs can have a large impact on
the behavior of the model. The intuition for this result is the familiar “the hill is ﬂat
at the top” argument. The household aims to achieve an optimal balance between
consumption and leisure. It follows from the ﬁrst-order conditions that near the op-
timum substituting consumption for leisure has only small effects on utility. In other
words, at the optimum the consumer is locally indifferent with respect to realloca-
tions of consumption and leisure. Therefore even small adjustment costs can have
sizable effects on the optimal allocation.
The size and persistence of the real effects can be increased by choosing a higher ad-
justment cost parameter a and a lower retained-earnings parameter λ.A sa increases,
the consumer adjusts savings less and less, and as λ decreases, retained earnings
ﬂow more slowly to the household. However, the results with a = 10 and λ = 0.14
displayed in Figure 7 are close in magnitude to the maximum that can be achieved.
Increasing λ add at most two quarters to the duration of the effects. Even if we in-
crease a to inﬁnity (i.e., savings are ﬁxed at the steady-state level, the consumer does
not adjust at all), the economy returns to the steady state at the rate at which retained
earnings are handed out to the consumer.
Figure 8 shows what happens if we do not allow for retained earnings. Here we set
λ = 1, so that all proﬁts are credited to the consumer in one piece, although given our
timing assumptions there is still a lag of one period. While the effects on impact of the
shock are similar, there is no persistence at all. To the contrary, output falls only in the
impact period, and is above steady state starting in the second period after the shock.
What is happening is that in the period after the shock the low proﬁts of the bank
are reﬂected in a lower balance on the consumer’s checking account. Earnings are
credited all at once, and after the negative shock the transfer from the bank is much
lower than usual. To re-balance assets, the consumer now would have to transfer
funds from the savings to the checking account. This adjustment is slowed down by
the adjustment cost, however, and the household is stuck with savings that are too
high relative to other assets for a few periods. Therefore an overabundance of funds
in the credit market arises, and the initial effects of the monetary shock are reversed.
Hence, we see that both the adjustment cost and retained earnings are necessary to
generate persistent real effects.
24Autocorrelated Money Shocks
So far, we have only considered the case of i.i.d. money shocks. While this proved
useful to illustrate the effect of the liquidity constraint, we know that in the real world
money shocks are autocorrelated. Autocorrelation in money supply may offset the
negative effect on output of a contractionary monetary shock, since in models with-
out adjustment costs, a lower expected inﬂation rate eases monetary distortions and
tends to raise output. We will see, however, that in the adjustment-cost model the
expected-inﬂation effectismore thanoffset byother factors. Figure 9 showsoutcomes
for the same parameters as in Figure 7, but with a positive autocorrelation in money
supply of σ = 0.5. The initial effect on output and prices is very similar to the case
of i.i.d. shocks. Subsequently, however, we see that the effects of the money shock
are considerably more persistent when money supply is autocorrelated. While the
expected-inﬂation effect is present, it is offset by additional liquidity effects arising in
the periods after the initial shock. The initial contractionary shock signals that further
negative shocks to money supply will follow in future periods. Due to the presence of
adjustment costs, the household does not fully offset these future shocks in advance,
so that the original liquidity effect is repeated on a smaller scale. Compared to this
additional liquidity effect, the lower expected inﬂation rate has only a minor positive
impact. Autocorrelation in money supply therefore ampliﬁes the effects of monetary
shocks relative to the i.i.d. model. Due to the larger required adjustments, the total
adjustment cost is higher than in the i.i.d. case, but still extremely small. The max-
imum adjustment cost now makes up about 0.0012 percent of time worked, which
translates into less than 23 seconds per quarter.
In the models considered so far, there are in effect two adjustment costs present: an
inﬁnite adjustment cost for immediate changes to savings (the liquidity constraint),
and a lower adjustment cost for later reallocations. Figure 10 shows results with the
same parameters that were used for Figure 9, but this time the model with cash-
in-advance timing is used. In other words, the consumer can adjust savings right
after the monetary shock is revealed, so that only one source of adjustment cost is
present. Since thismodelhas adifferent steady state, the outcomes are shifted relative
to Figure 9. Apart from the shift, it is remarkable how similar the outcomes are. The
effect of the monetary shock on output and prices is virtually identical in the two
versions of the model. This implies that once adjustment costs are introduced into
25the model, the liquidity constraint is no longer required to generate real effects of
monetary shocks.
Capital Accumulation
Yet another potential source of propagation of monetary shocks is endogenous capital
accumulation. To make results comparable, the calibration of the capital model is
identical to the labor-only model wherever possible. The adjustment cost function
now also depends on investment zt a n di ss p e c i ﬁ e da s :
g(it,zt)=a(it + b)2 + aK(it + bK)2,
where bK is chosen to result in zero adjustment costs in the deterministic steady state.
The capital share is set to α = 0.33, which matches its empirical counterpart in the
U.S., and the depreciation rate is δ = 0.02 per quarter. Figure 11 shows results for
the capital model with adjustment costs of a = 10 and aK = 1, and an autocorrelation
parameter of money supply of ρ = 0.5. The adjustment cost parameter for capital is
chosen to be smaller than the one for savings, since investment is much higher than
the transfer to the savings account in the steady state. The results for output, prices,
and assets are very similar to the result of the corresponding model without capital
(see Figure 9). Notice that the return on capital is temporarily lower than the interest
rate, since the higher cost of ﬁnancing lowers returns to capital owners. In the long
run, the interest rate and the return on capital cannot move in different directions,
since bank savings and capital are competing investments from the perspective of
the household. An immediate adjustment does not take place, however, due to the
presence of adjustment costs. The stock of capital declines slightly after the initial
shock, amplifying the negative effect on output. Quantitatively, however, the decline
in capital is very small.
Figure 12 shows outcomes for the same model without an adjustment cost for capital,
aK = 0, but keeping the adjustment cost for asset transfers at a = 10. This model leads
to noticeably different results. Output still declines after the shock, and the effect is
more persistent than before. Consumption, however, increases after the monetary
shock, contrary to what happened in the other models. In this model, consumption
growth is driven by the return on capital, which is not subject to adjustment cost.
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No Capital, a = 10, ρ = 0, λ = 0.14 0.46 0.15 0.02 -0.03
No Capital, a = 10, ρ = 0, λ = 1 0.30 -0.18 -0.11 -0.08
No Capital, a = 10, ρ = 0.5, λ = 0.14 0.73 0.43 0.21 0.06
Capital, a = 10, aK = 1, ρ = 0.5, λ = 0.14 0.72 0.42 0.18 0.03
Capital, a = 10, aK = 0, ρ = 0.5, λ = 0.14 0.69 0.46 0.27 0.12
Table 2: The Autocorrelation of Output
As before, the return on capital falls after the monetary shock, partly because labor
supplyfalls, andpartly becausethe ﬁnancingcost increases. Alowerreturn on capital
implies that the household desires a lower consumption growth rate, which increases
current consumption at the expense of future consumption. The household therefore
consumes more and invests less. A few periods down the road, however, the by then
lower capital stock pushes consumption below its steady-state value. The immediate
jump in consumption also leads to a lower initial price level, through the cash-in-
advance constraint. Thus, the behavior of inﬂation is also different in this model.
We therefore see that the behavior of the capital model depends crucially on the ad-
justment cost for capital. With a cost, the outcomes are basically the same as in the
labor-only model. Without an adjustment cost, there is still a persistent decline in
output, but the reaction of consumption changes signiﬁcantly. Given that the model
period is only one quarter, the case with an adjustment cost is probably more real-
istic, especially considering that time-to-build or time-to-plan frictions may also be
present.
The Autocorrelation of Output
To summarize the effects of adjustment costs and retained earnings on persistence,
Table 2 displays the autocorrelation function of output in different versions of the
model. With i.i.d. money shocks and no adjustment costs (not shown), the autocorre-
lation function is zero at all lags. With i.i.d. shocks and an adjustment cost of a = 10,
autocorrelation is positive, but fades out after three quarters. With an adjustment cost
but without retained earnings (λ = 1), the autocorrelation is negative from the sec-
27ond quarter on, due to the reversal in the reaction of output displayed in Figure 8. If
the money shock is persistent, output inherits this quality. With λ = 0.14 and ρ = 0.5,
autocorrelation increases at all lags, and fades out more slowly. Introducing capital
does not change the results, as long as an adjustment cost for capital is present. Fi-
nally, in the model with freely adjustable capital, the autocorrelation of output decays
more slowly than in any of the other models.
6 Conclusions
Our quantitative results show that portfolio adjustment costs are a promising expla-
nation for the persistent effects of monetary policy shocks observed in the data. In
the baseline calibration, the effect of a contractionary shock on output lasts about a
year. At the same time, the realized adjustment cost never exceeds the equivalent of
three seconds per quarter. The results also show that institutional features concerning
the ﬂow of funds between households and the business sector may be an important
determinant of the monetary transmission mechanism. In the model, banks retain
earnings and credit proﬁts to the households only with a delay. While the timing of
dividends does not have any consequences in a frictionless model, in the adjustment-
cost model accounting for retained earnings turns out to be essential for generating
persistence.
The results suggest two promising areas for future research. First, in the present
model retained earnings are introduced as an exogenously given feature of the econ-
omy. The economic determinants of these arrangements should be investigated more
closely. Also, more information is neededon the exact quantity and timing of the ﬂow
of funds between ﬁrms and households. In the language of the model, measuring λ
is as important as measuring the adjustment cost.
Second, a limitation of the current framework is that the adjustment-cost function is
assumed to be convex. This assumption was necessary to generate continuous policy
functions within a representative-agent framework. From a microeconomic perspec-
tive, amore realistic formulation for theadjustmentcost would beaﬁxedcost foreach
transaction that is independent of the size of the transaction. Once the consumer has
walked to the bank or called the broker on the phone, the size of the ensuing trans-
28action should no longer matter. With a ﬁxed cost, however, the representative-agent
framework reaches its limits. In a ﬁxed-cost model, the effects of monetary policy
shocks are a function of the fraction of agents who adjust their portfolio in a given
period. This fraction is restricted to be either zero or one in the representative-agent
model.
Unfortunately, models with heterogeneous agents and ﬁxed costs are difﬁcult to ana-
lyze. Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2002) present a model with heterogenous agents,
ﬁxed costs for portfolio adjustments, and monetary shocks, but to simplify the anal-
ysis they consider an endowment economy, so that output and employment cannot
react to to shocks. Solving a heterogenous-agent model with ﬁxed costs that allows
for real effects of monetary shocks would constitute substantial progress towards un-
derstanding the monetary transmission mechanism.
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Figure 3: Impulse Response Functions, Real Proﬁts
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Figure 4: The Sequence of Events with Liquidity Timing
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Figure 5: The Sequence of Events with Cash-in-Advance Timing














































Figure 6: Impulse Response with Liquidity Timing, a = 0, λ = 0.14, σ = 0













































Figure 7: Impulse Response with Liquidity Timing, a = 10, λ = 0.14, σ = 0

















































Figure 8: Impulse Response with Liquidity Timing, a = 10, λ = 1, σ = 0

















































Figure 9: Impulse Response with Liquidity Timing, a = 10, λ = 0.14, σ = 0.5















































Figure 10: Impulse Response with Cash-in-Advance Timing, a = 10, λ = 0.14, σ = 0.5





































































Figure 11: Impulse Response with Capital Accumulation, a = 10, aK = 1, λ = 0.14,
σ = 0.5













































































Figure 12: Impulse Response with Capital Accumulation, a = 10, aK = 0, λ = 0.14,
σ = 0
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